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„“Genocide” Charge in Rwanda‟ blared the headline in The Times; a few days later it was 
„Rwanda Policy of Genocide Alleged.‟1  Yet these headlines are not from 1994, but 1964.  
And while the massacres to which they refer occurred on a far smaller scale than the 1994 
genocide, they are unprecedented as massacres targeted at the Tutsi minority as a group.  
They occurred at the end of a decade of radical change for the tiny nation.  In 1954, Rwanda 
was administered as part of Ruanda-Urundi, a United Nations Trust Territory under Belgian 
trusteeship.
2
  The Tutsi minority was regarded as racially superior, enjoyed preferential 
access to privilege and almost exclusive access to indigenous positions of authority.  Their 
position seemed stably entrenched.  Yet an examination of Rwanda just ten years later reveals 
a starkly contrasting picture.  By 1964, the newly independent Republic of Rwanda was ruled 
almost exclusively by the Hutu majority.
3
  More than 300,000 Tutsi refugees were scattered 
around its borders; thousands had been killed in massacres following a failed refugee 
invasion.
4
 In the intervening decade the nation had experienced the full throes of rapid 
decolonisation, revolution and its first democratic elections.  Crucial to understanding this 
extraordinary decade in Rwanda‟s history is an understanding of issues surrounding ethnic 
identity.  Moreover, many of the root causes of the 1994 genocide can be found in the events 
of this tumultuous period.  This article will shed insight on both, through an exploration of 
ethnic polarisation in Rwanda between 1954 and 1964.  
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 “Every „serious‟ study of Rwanda ... begins by giving the ethnic composition of the 
population (84 per cent Hutu, 15 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Twa)” quipped a United 
Nations Commissioner in 1962.
5
  The key role of Hutu and Tutsi identities and interrelations 
in understanding Rwandan history is undisputed.  The precise nature of these identities, 
however, has been the subject of intense debate.  The distinction between the Hutu majority 
and Tutsi minority subgroups has been varyingly described as one of race, tribe, caste, class, 
domination and subjugation, ethnicity and political identity.  Each descriptor appears to have 
more than a kernel of truth, but also elements of distortion and inaccuracy.  Moreover, the 
nature of these identities is not a static one, as they have changed over time and in response to 
both internal and external influences.  Whereas today these identities are commonly referred 
to as ethnic identities, for much of Rwanda‟s history they were considered racial.  First 
German then Belgian colonial authorities considered the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as distinct 
races, which came to have profound consequences for the Rwandan people.   
From the very first, Rwanda‟s colonisers also ranked each „race‟ hierarchically.  For the Twa, 
“quite similar to the apes whom he chases in the forest,” that rank was clearly at the bottom.6  
By contrast, “the Mututsi of good race has nothing of the Negro, apart from his colour ... 
gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare 
among primitive people.”7  But the racially obsessed Europeans went much further than 
simple hierarchical rankings.  The concept that a „negroid race‟ could be of sufficient 
intelligence and development to organise a kingdom such as that of Rwanda was apparently 
inconceivable.  Thus the „Hamitic hypothesis‟ was invoked.  First proposed by explorer John 
Speke, this theory supposed that superior, ruling groups within Africa, (this category 
eventually to include the Tutsi) were actually migrant descendents of Noah‟s son Ham.  They 
were thus not truly „Negro‟, but the lowest rung on the Caucasian ladder.8  The notion behind 
this concept, which had multiple variations, was that as descendents of Noah they remained 
part of humanity, with their organisational faculties attributed to these origins.
9
  As 
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descendents of Noah‟s cursed son Ham, however, they were (comfortably) inferior to 
Europeans.
10
  Some variations, however, went so far as to suggest the Tutsi was “a European 
under black skin.”11  Where, precisely, the Tutsi came from was the source of much 
conjecture.  Southern Ethiopia and ancient Egypt were commonly proposed, although some 
of the more bizarre theories suggested India, Tibet, the lost continent of Atlantis and even the 
Garden of Eden.
12
  Of more importance were the three concepts at the heart of the theory: that 
the Tutsi were a distinct race, that they were racially superior to the Hutu and Twa, and that 
they were subjugators of foreign origin.  By the 1950s, this racialised and hierarchical 
interpretation of subgroup identity had long been institutionalised within Belgian colonial 
policies, and internalised by much of the Rwandan population.   
In the early 1950s, Rwanda stood on the cusp of a period of major change.  While its remote 
location had offered protection from many of the travails of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, in the wake of World War Two external pressures mounted.  The broad 
mandate of good governance upon which Belgium‟s colonial authority rested under its 
League of Nations Mandate was replaced by far more onerous obligations under a United 
Nations Trusteeship Agreement.  Belgium now agreed to take “all proper measures to assure 
the political evolution of the peoples of Ruanda-Urundi”, and ensure progression towards 
independence.
13
  Moreover, triennial UN Visiting Missions would provide unprecedented 
active oversight.  The reports and recommendations of the UN Visiting Missions, and the 
Belgian response to them, became a major focus of events in Rwanda for much of the 
Trusteeship period, and a driver of the rapid change there in the 1950s.   
In particular, the report of the first Visiting Mission, in 1948, led to the commencement of a 
period of swift development.  While the report praised Belgium‟s economic, educational and 
social achievements in Rwanda, it expressed concern with the slow pace of change.
14
  It 
recommended a major expansion of education and increased indigenous responsibility in the 
administration of the nation.
15
  It proposed the abolition of ubuletwa, an onerous form of 
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forced labour used for tasks such as road building, and its replacement with a monetary tax.  
Finally, it recommended “The administration should seek further to democratize the whole 
political structure as far as possible.”16  The Belgian government grumbled, but largely 
acquiesced in the major recommendations.  It commenced work on a ten-year plan, primarily 
focused on economic development, but also providing significant financial support for public 
health, agriculture and education.
17
  These developments, however, had different impacts for 
the Hutu and Tutsi populations, in time also influencing intergroup relations.    
By the mid-1950s, the changes were beginning to have a substantial effect.  By 1954, some 
750,000 Rwandan children were attending school, although the vast majority continued to 
receive only a rudimentary one or two year primary education.
18
  Post-primary education was 
slowly expanding – by 1954 there were 1400 trainee teachers, and by 1956 2,500 students 
received secondary education across Ruanda-Urundi.
19
  This still represented only a tiny 
fraction of the population, however, which drew increasing criticism from the Trusteeship 
Council.
20
  Moreover, the Tutsi minority, who had previously had almost exclusive access to 
post-primary education, continued to dominate the secondary schools.
21
  Indeed, the UN 
Visiting Mission for 1957 noted that less than 10 per cent of students in secondary schools in 
Rwanda were Hutu.
22
  The Belgian Administration, however, retained its misgivings about 
almost any sort of higher education, and particularly so for Hutu children.  Researcher Mary 
Duarte remarked: “By 1960 – indeed, after four decades under Belgian control – Ruanda-
Urundi had neither a viable education system nor an educated elite prepared to govern.  
Fewer than 100 natives of Ruanda-Urundi had received post-secondary education, and no 
literate population had emerged.”23  The African studies specialist Jnanabrota Bhattacharyya, 
however, has commented:  
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On the other hand, the spread of primary education to about three fourths of the 
population is not without political and social consequences even when this is not 
followed up for most pupils by higher education.  Literacy, even low literacy, furnishes 
an equipment for better communication and thereby for better political mobilization … 
In the Hutu‟s political awakening in the fifties, the role of extensive primary education 
must be duly recognized.  Education awakened a sense of resentment and bitterness 
among the masses, which was politically explosive.
24
 
 
The economic impact of colonial development policies was also becoming apparent. There 
had been no serious famine since that of 1943-44.  Whilst the Belgians still considered there 
to be some risk of famine in Rwanda, a range of strategies had been put in place to both 
prevent and mitigate the impact of such an event.
25
  Previous famines had disproportionately 
affected Hutu, whose ties to the land and the seasons left them with little ability to combat 
drought, but this vulnerability was now lessened.
26
  Living standards, too, were becoming 
more equitable – at least if one excluded wealthy Tutsi from the comparison.27  The small 
Tutsi elite continued to monopolise much of the nation‟s wealth and control indigenous 
positions of power, and there was no equivalent Hutu elite.  Amongst the majority of the 
ordinary population of Hutu and Tutsi, however, disparity in income and assets was 
diminishing.
28
  Access to medical care had also become more equitable under Belgian rule.  
Whereas in pre-colonial times the cost of traditional healers for medical problems had been 
prohibitive for many Hutu, under the Belgian administration medical care became widely 
available, effective, and affordable – independent of subgroup identity.29   
The increasing monetarisation of the Rwandan economy enabled Hutu to realise the 
advantages and opportunities associated with commerce.  In part this was a result of the 
decision of the indigenous Rwandan Superior Council to abolish the traditional patron-client 
relationship of ubuhake in 1954.  Traditionally, wealth in Rwanda was primarily associated 
with the ownership of cattle.  Under the system of ubuhake, a (usually) Tutsi patron would 
provide custodianship of one or more cows to a (typically) Hutu client, in exchange for 
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agricultural products and sometimes also labour.  While the relationship could be 
“moderately reciprocal”, particularly given the high status of cows within traditional 
Rwandan society, it was more often one of unequal power, with considerable potential for 
exploitation.
30
  Thus ubuhake was associated with both the authority of the Tutsi, and a spirit 
of Hutu subservience.
31
   
In abolishing ubuhake, the Rwandan Superior Council was following a major 
recommendation of the 1951 UN Visiting Mission.  Yet in doing so, it failed to address the 
key issue of land tenure.  Thus Tutsi continued to possess rights over the grazing land, as 
traditional custodians of the land for the Rwandan monarch, and could continue to demand 
payment – in money, services, or cows – for grazing rights.32  In practice, “The Batutsi lost 
little in the division of the cattle, while the Bahutu, who had to pay for grazing rights, barely 
profited from the maintenance of their cattle.”33  This issue also had wider ramifications for 
agriculture.  The introduction of the cash crop of coffee offered Hutu a powerful alternative 
to the previous reliance on cattle – bound up in the subservient ubuhake relationship – for 
wealth.  Thus according to one analyst, “Coffee was thus an instrument of emancipation and 
gave the Hutu the self-confidence and the economic basis he needed to break his bonds.
34
  
Yet the land tenure problem meant a large portion of the coffee had to be paid for use of the 
land.
35
  Issues surrounding land tenure became a major source of division between the Hutu 
and Tutsi subgroups.   
The UN Visiting Missions placed strong emphasis on the need for democratisation.  Initially, 
the Belgian government had responded to this pressure by introducing major reforms to the 
indigenous conciliar system.
36
  An advisory council was created for each level of the 
hierarchical system of chiefdoms, which was required to be consulted for all major decisions 
at that level.
37
  Yet while membership of the councils was partially elected by the subordinate 
level, there was no universal suffrage in their selection and they were limited to an advisory 
capacity.  It wasn‟t until 1956 that adult male suffrage was introduced into the election 
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process – in response to the recommendations of the 1954 UN Visiting Mission.  
Nevertheless, the system could hardly be described as democratic.  Notables responsible for 
electing the subchiefdom councils – that is, the lowest level of councils – would themselves 
now be elected rather than nominated.  Each council would subsequently vote on the 
membership of the superordinate council, as previously.  At each ascending level of the 
councils, Hutu representation diminished.  At the highest level of the Superior Council, for 
example, Tutsi representation was a staggering 97% of the membership.
38
  At the lower 
levels, however, and in regions in which Tutsi dominance was less entrenched, a more 
complex picture emerged as Hutu gained increased levels of representation.  Arguably 
though, the most important outcome of these elections was not their result.  Rather, for the 
Tutsi elite these elections “rang the first warning bell for the local authorities that the 
emerging consciousness among the Hutu masses posed a serious challenge to them.”39  For 
the Hutu, the elections had exposed their demographic dominance, and the potential of Hutu 
power, yet in the end, had “changed nothing at all.”40   
The advent of the UN Trusteeship had fundamentally changed the nature of Belgian colonial 
rule, and the outcomes of the first decade of Belgian governance under the auspices of the 
UN contrast quite significantly with those from the period of the League of Nations Mandate.  
The first three decades of Belgian colonialism had led to the solidification of Tutsi rule, the 
consolidation of Tutsi privilege and the internalisation of the Hamitic hypothesis within 
Rwandan society.  By contrast, the policies implemented in Rwanda in the late forties and 
early fifties came to be – often unintentionally – about opportunities for Hutu.  Expanded 
education gave Hutu a thirst for knowledge; the first forays into a democratic system led to a 
dawning awareness of the possible power of the Hutu majority.  The abolition of ubuhake and 
ubuletwa, and the more varied opportunities in the new money economy, opened potential 
routes to prosperity for Hutu.  The standard of living of Hutu and (at least some) Tutsi even 
converged to some extent.  Yet in all these areas, Hutu remained substantially disadvantaged.  
The limited opportunities were countered by an increased awareness of the constraints.  
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The 1954 UN Visiting Mission to Rwanda would be the last to observe that “There appeared 
to be very little development of general or even local public opinion” in the country.41  The 
rapid changes of the post-war decade led to the emergence of a Hutu consciousness, or what 
has been dubbed the „Hutu awakening‟.  A tiny Hutu intelligentsia began to form, that felt 
keenly the systemic disadvantages to which Hutu were subject, and the frustrations of Hutu 
powerlessness.
42
  In March 1957, some of this frustration was expressed in the Bahutu 
Manifesto, signed by nine members of the Hutu counter-elite, including future Rwandan 
president Grégorie Kayibanda.  The Manifesto challenged every facet of Rwandan society:  
Some people have asked whether this is a social or a racial conflict … In reality and in 
the minds of men it is both.  It can, however, be narrowed down for it is primarily a 
question of a political monopoly held by one race, the Mututsi, and, in view of the 
social situation as a whole, it has become an economic and social monopoly.  In view, 
also, of the de facto selection in education, this political, economic and social monopoly 
has also become a cultural monopoly, to the great despair of the Bahutu, who see 
themselves condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual workers, and this, 
worse still, after achieving an independence which they will have unwittingly helped to 
obtain.
43
 
For the Tutsi elite, the Manifesto – published to influence the 1957 UN Visiting Mission – 
represented a menacing threat to their entrenched privilege.
44
  They too sought to influence 
the Visiting Mission, through the Statement of Views.  In this document, the Superior Council 
focussed upon the need for rapid preparation for independence, through empowering the 
present elite.
45
  In stark contrast to the Bahutu Manifesto, nowhere was there any reference 
whatsoever to the deep cleavages between the Hutu and Tutsi subgroups.   Instead, faced with 
this challenge to their previous hegemony, the Superior Council “set up a characteristically 
mythical reinterpretation of the ancient socio-political structure of Rwanda.”46  The Hamitic 
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myth was replaced with a focus upon the cooperation between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and the 
essential feature of Rwandan society was recast as “its homogeneity as a people and a 
nation”.47  The Hutu-Tutsi-Twa distinctions were to be radically de-emphasised in a bid for 
the elite to retain its power. 
The Report of the 1954 Visiting Mission to Ruanda-Urundi had completely failed to mention 
the problem of subgroup identity in Rwanda, and it was left to the Belgians to point this out 
in their response:  
The Visiting Mission … makes no reference to the deep cleavages which divide the 
Batutsi, the Bahutu, the Batwa and the Waswahili.  Those cleavages are obvious … and 
they dominate the whole of social life.
48
 
In 1957, the Statement of Views and Bahutu Manifesto awaiting the Mission ensured that 
these issues could not help but be noticed.  Yet the only solution the 1957 Mission 
recommended, with “almost ridiculous optimism”, was further education.49  According to the 
political scientist Rawson, the failure of the Trusteeship Council to realise “the disintegrative 
potential of the traditional social stratification … was a crucial factor in the developmental 
process.”50  In the same vein, the 1957 Mission failed to deal with the land tenure problem, 
despite its “economic, social and ultimately political ramifications” being “most acute.”51  
Yet at this stage, the political ideals of the Hutu and Tutsi were being expressed in a moderate 
fashion, and “the way was still open for peaceful change and compromise in Rwanda.”52  It is 
unfortunate that the UN Trusteeship Council, the Belgian administration and the Indigenous 
authorities each failed to take decisive action in response to the Statement of Views, the 
Bahutu Manifesto, or the rising tide of ferment within Rwanda.  The Rwandan monarch, the 
Mwami, further inflamed the situation by adopting a partisan pro-Tutsi stance, which was 
particularly damaging in light of the Mwami’s traditional role as the ultimate arbiter in 
Rwandan society.
53
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Thus it was in a climate of increasing tension and polarisation that the first Rwandan political 
parties were formed in the late 1950s.  This is reflected in their formation along the 
boundaries of ethnic identity.  The Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement 
et de l’Émancipation Hutu (MDR-PARMEHUTU) was led by Kayibanda, and its program 
was based upon the Bahutu Manifesto.  It sought “a true union of all the Rwandan people 
without any race dominating another as is the case today.”54  L’Association pour la 
Promotion Sociale de la Masse, or APROSOMA, sought “to unite Hutu and Tutsi poor 
against Tutsi privilege,” and primarily drew support from the southern regions of Rwanda (in 
contrast to MDR-PARMEHUTU‟s powerbase in the north and centre of the country).55  
Despite its stated aims, however, it developed as a Hutu party in practice.
56
  In opposition 
stood UNAR, Union Nationale Rwandaise.  Created by conservative Tutsi (although 
nominally led by Hutu François Rukeba), it espoused the „traditionalist‟ view of Rwandan 
society.
57
  Yet, “Although the Tutsi authorities constituted the hard core of the party, loyalty 
to UNAR was by no means confined to the Tutsis.  It had a large number of adherents among 
the Hutus, explained partly by the feudal prestige and influence the Tutsi authorities still 
enjoyed among the masses and partly by the threats and pressure they used.”58  Very quickly 
debate crystallised around the key issues of democracy and independence.  MDR-
PARMEHUTU “insisted on a genuine democratization of all existing institutions before the 
granting of independence.”59  For UNAR, however, the priority was immediate 
independence.
60
 
“Rwanda in 1959 … was a land of tensions, rumours, and troubles”, wrote anthropologist 
Helen Codere, reflecting on her time in the country.
61
  Tension increased dramatically when 
the Belgian administration announced on 13 January a plan for the decolonisation of 
neighbouring Congo, in the wake of the Leopoldville riots.
62
  The new policy had arisen from 
the report of the Working Group that had recently visited the Congo; a similar group visited 
Ruanda-Urundi in April.  Intergroup frictions escalated, as organisations representing each 
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subgroup sought to convince the working group of their proposals for Rwanda‟s future.  
Tensions rose still further with the unexpected death of Mwami Mutara III on 25 July.  With 
no clear succession plan in place, and with wild rumours circulating as to the cause of death, 
the colonial administration was taken by surprise when indigenous authorities simply 
announced the new Mwami at Mutara‟s funeral.63  Rwanda remained a “simmering 
cauldron”.64  Elections were due at the end of the year; however the form they would take had 
not been finalised.
65
  The report of the Working Group was anticipated, with potentially 
enormous ramifications for the future of the country.  The political parties commenced a 
period of frenetic activity.  UNAR‟s approach, in particular, involved violence and a 
campaign of intimidation against opposition leaders and supporters.
66
  By 1 November, it 
took only a spark to ignite the Rwandan revolution.   
Like many revolutions that have changed the course of a nation‟s history, the Rwandan 
Revolution began as a spontaneous uprising.  An altercation in which a band of “young 
UNAR militants” attacked a PARMEHUTU leader led to a Hutu retaliation that escalated 
into revolution.
67
  Hutu-led violence and the burning of Tutsi huts rapidly spread.  As the 
subsequent Visiting Mission Report noted:  
The operations were generally carried out by a fairly similar process.  Incendiaries would set 
off in bands of some tens of persons.  Armed with matches and paraffin, which the 
indigenous inhabitants used in large quantities for their lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses 
they passed on their way and set fire to them.  On their way they would enlist other 
incendiaries to follow in the procession while the first recruits, too exhausted to continue, 
would give up and return home.  Thus day after day fires spread from hill to hill.  Generally 
speaking the incendiaries, who were often unarmed, did not attack the inhabitants of the huts 
and were content with pillaging and setting fire to them.
68
 
It is notable that, by and large, there were few fatalities associated with these attacks.  
Nevertheless, serious damage was done, as thousands and thousands of huts were pillaged 
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and burned, plantations plundered and livestock killed.
69
   In some parts of the north, not a 
single Tutsi hut was left standing.
70
   
The Tutsi reaction to the uprising was swift, yet far more organised than the largely 
spontaneous Hutu incendiarism.
71
  UNAR leaders, working from the Mwami’s palace, 
quickly organised commando units and dispatched them to arrest or kill specific Hutu 
leaders.
72
  According to the UN Visiting Mission report: 
Each commando party amounted to some hundreds of persons or more, and included a 
majority of Hutu, but the leaders were generally Tutsi or Twa.  The group would set off 
on its mission with very definite instructions.  In other cases, emissaries were sent out 
from Nyanza with verbal orders instructing them to bring back or kill certain persons … 
It seems to be an established fact, moreover, that in many cases a commando group set 
out with orders only to arrest a person, but in effect killed him, either because he resisted 
arrest or because some attackers had the instinct to kill.
73
 
Well over a dozen prominent Hutu were killed in this way, including two leaders of 
APROSOMA.  UNAR appeared to be trying to eliminate the Hutu leadership, and thus its 
opposition. 
The Belgian administration, despite anticipating the disturbance, took more than a week to 
bring the situation under control.
74
  It was not until 14 November that quiet was fully 
restored.  At least 200 people were dead, and several hundred more wounded.
75
  Meanwhile, 
in an effort to calm the situation, Belgium released a major policy statement on the future of 
Rwanda.  The radical reforms overhauled the conciliar structure to create communes, for 
which councillors would be elected through universal male suffrage.
76
  They in turn would 
elect a burgomaster and a new State Council, which would progressively be granted 
legislative powers and autonomy.
77
  While the Mwami would remain, the role would largely 
become that of a figurehead.   
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Perhaps the most significant outcome of the revolution, however, was that it resulted in a 
profound change in the attitude of the Belgian Administration towards the Hutu and Tutsi 
subgroups.  The previous policies of according privilege to the Tutsi minority were replaced 
by a much more egalitarian approach – whether by necessity or calculation.  In the course of 
the uprising, hundreds of Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs had fled, been killed, been forced to 
resign due to Hutu opposition, or had been involved in the Tutsi counter-attacks and 
subsequently arrested or removed from office.
78
  The Belgian Administration filled these 
vacant posts predominantly with Hutu.  Thus, by 1 March the number of Hutu chiefs went 
from 0 to 22, out of a total of 45 chiefdoms, and the number of Hutu subchiefs rose from 10 
to 297, out of a total of 531.
79
  Four months after the revolution, it “had suddenly become a 
smashing Hutu success.”80 
The atmosphere in Rwanda remained charged in the wake of the revolution.  Sporadic 
outbreaks of violence destabilised the nation throughout 1960.  The waves of violence 
continued to occur along ethnic lines, leading to growing numbers of Tutsi refugees.  
Increasingly, intergroup relations became the central issue around which other cleavages 
polarised.
81
  Thus UNAR politicised the refugees‟ problems, and proved hostile to the 
Belgian Administration‟s attempts to resolve them.82  UNAR‟s campaign specifically 
targeted Tutsi with a progressive agenda, undermining the possibility of more unifying 
platforms gaining currency.
83
  At the same time, there was also an “intense politicisation of 
the racial cleavages by PARMEHUTU.”84  The Hamitic hypothesis was reinterpreted, and, 
according to the political scientist Lemarchand, now “The Tutsi are seen as the Hamitic 
foreigners who imposed their rule on the unsuspecting Bantu populations by cunning and 
cruelty, using their cows and beautiful women to bait the Hutu into submission.”85   
The UN Visiting Mission that arrived in Rwanda in March of 1960 did little to aid the 
situation.  It sought an amnesty for events during the revolution, but as the Belgian 
Administration countered, the idea of an amnesty was not politically neutral given that the 
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Tutsi had gone far beyond the Hutu in the scope of their crimes.86  Moreover, the speed and 
intensity of events in Rwanda meant that “Its observations came too late to be useful in 
changing the political situation.”87  Despite the ongoing sporadic violence, the Belgian 
Administration pressed ahead with the communal elections set for June.  Yet they, too, failed 
to bring calm to the country.  PARMEHUTU swept to power, with some 75 per cent of the 
vote.
88
  Rather than leading to democratic local government, however, the transfer of power 
seemed more “the transference of political clientelism to the Hutu stratum.”89  Within five 
months, the opposition parties – including UNAR – banded together to form a „Common 
Front‟ to protest “the dictatorial regime PARMEHUTU.”90   
The Belgian Administration was strained still further by repeated cross-border raids by 
groups of Tutsi refugees in the border zones of Uganda and the Congo.  These groups came 
to be known as inyenzi, or cockroaches, for their night-time attacks.  Meanwhile, the Mwami 
and UNAR petitioned the UN repeatedly, where they cultivated a highly sympathetic General 
Assembly.  On 20 December 1960, the General Assembly thus recommended a range of 
reforms, including that legislative elections planned for 15 January be postponed, to a date to 
be determined by a UN Commission that would visit Ruanda-Urundi in late January.  Furious 
that the UN-proposed actions would advantage UNAR, PARMEHUTU chose the day of the 
UN Visiting Mission‟s arrival for a coup d’état.91  The UN was incensed when the Belgian 
Administration promptly recognised the powers of the newly declared government.
92
  
Following the coup, PARMEHUTU – with Kayibanda at its helm – effectively took control 
of running the nation, with the Belgian Administration adopting a supporting role.
93
  A new 
Belgian government also sought to pacify the UN by adhering to its central 
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recommendations, including those for legislative elections and a referendum on the future of 
the monarchy.   
By this time, the stark ethnic polarisation led to substantial conflation between political and 
ethnic divisions.  In its anger following the Gitarama coup, for example, the UN Commission 
reported in March 1961 that “A racial dictatorship of one party has been set up in Rwanda, 
and the developments of the last eighteen months have consisted in the transition from one 
type of repressive regime to another.”94  As the legislative elections rescheduled for 
September 1961 approached, tension erupted into violence once more.  There were repeated 
outbreaks of violence, incendiarism, and a large rise in the number of refugees.  Belgian 
security forces struggled to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control.  As the UN 
reported: 
Serious disturbances took place in several regions of the country, including the districts 
of Myanza, Astrida, Gitarama, and Kiungu and some communes in Kigali and Kibuye.  
As a result of the incidents there, tens of thousands of new disaster victims and refugees 
had to leave their homes and seek refuge.
95
 
Both sides initiated and participated in the violence, although there were conflicting opinions 
as to those primarily responsible.
96
   
There was an overwhelming turnout of 95 per cent of registered voters for the election.  
PARMEHUTU received 77.7 per cent of the votes, UNAR 16.8 per cent, APROSOMA 3.5 
per cent, and RADER less than 1 per cent.  This led to PARMEHUTU dominating the 
Legislative Assembly with 35 of the 44 seats, UNAR receiving 7 and APROSOMA 2.
97
  The 
polarisation of Rwandan society along ethnic lines was clear: “The Legislative Assembly thus 
had an ethnic composition of 84% Hutu and 16% Tutsi – corresponding closely to the 
proportion of Hutu and of Tutsi in the population.”98  About 80 per cent of voters also 
declared a preference for the abolition of the monarchy.  After much debate and vacillation, 
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the United Nations eventually agreed to accept the results of the elections as free and fair.  
The final preparations for independence commenced.   
Following the elections, Rwanda continued to be beset by sporadic violence, and a large 
refugee problem.  If the pre-election violence had been instigated by both PARMEHUTU and 
opposition forces, the pre-independence violence consisted largely of bands of Tutsi inyenzi 
conducting cross-border raids from bases in neighbouring countries.  According to Rwandan 
government sources, there were no fewer than 27 incidences of such violence between 
October 1961 and May 1962.
99
  There were many acts of murder, huts being set alight, and 
pillage.  Biumba in northern Rwanda was particularly targeted, and attackers were often 
armed with machine guns or revolvers, as well as more traditional weapons.  Biumba was 
also the location of a particularly harsh reprisal by the authorities, when following two raids 
there was a massacre of local Tutsi, further burning of huts and considerable pillage.
100
  The 
highest estimates put the death toll at between one and two thousand.
101
  The UN reported: 
“The situation … appeared alarming to all experienced observers.”102  The refugee situation 
was particularly problematic, difficult even to quantify, let alone to resolve.  Despite UN 
attempts to address the problem, by the time of independence, approximately 100,000 
Rwandan refugees were scattered between Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Congo.
103
   
On 1 July 1962, the Republic of Rwanda achieved independence.  Despite the massive ethnic 
polarisation that marked the decolonisation period, the Tutsi minority retained at least some 
political voice.  Under agreements reached with the UN, UNAR had secured two ministerial 
posts in the government and some additional senior postings, which along with its seven 
elected seats in the National Assembly ensured a viable opposition.
104
  Two inyenzi 
incursions into Rwanda on 4 and 17 July – challenging the nation as it drew its very first 
breath – were unsuccessful, as the authorities had received advance intelligence warning of 
both.
105
  Following these attacks, the situation settled, and Rwanda began the process of 
nation building.  A number of development projects were commenced in conjunction with 
                                                 
99
 Rwanda, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Toute la vérité sur le terrorisme “Inyenzi” au Rwanda: une mise 
au point du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères du Rwanda (Kigali: Service d‟information, 1964), pp. 11-12.  
100
 Mamdani, p. 129.  
101
 United Nations, Question of the Future of Ruanda-Urundi: Report of the United Nations Commission for 
Ruanda-Urundi established under General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), A/5126, 30 May 1962, p. 45.  
102
 Ibid.  
103
 Webster, p. 84.  
104
 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 197.  
105
 “Indépendance du Rwanda: un an et demi de paix et de concorde nationale”, in Rwanda, Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères, Toute la vérité, pp. 13-14.  
other nations, Rwanda sought foreign aid from numerous sources, and an austerity campaign 
began which included the raising of taxes.
106
  A program commenced to „democratise‟ 
education, which meant radically altering the ethnic composition of the student body to more 
accurately reflect that of the nation.
107
  The problems of land tenure were addressed in the 
Rwandan constitution, and a final redistribution of cattle and land erased the last remnants of 
the feudal system, although not without some discord.
108
  Overall, despite the dire predictions 
of some foreign officials and reporters, the first year and a half of Rwandan independence 
was surprisingly calm, and surprisingly successful.   
The relative peace in the immediate aftermath of Rwanda‟s independence was not indicative 
of UNAR and/or Tutsi acceptance of the new situation, however, but rather representative of 
UNAR‟s disorganisation and factionalism. 109  The August 1963 communal elections appear 
to have spurred UNAR into violent action.  In these first elections since independence, tactics 
such as intimidation of UNAR candidates resumed, and there were several killings.
110
  
UNAR responded by boycotting the elections, which only had the effect of PARMEHUTU 
receiving 98 per cent of the votes cast and almost total governmental power.
111
  Following 
this defeat, UNAR leader Rukeba was able to obtain some funding and weaponry, and to 
facilitate some organisation and coordination amongst the inyenzi – particularly in Burundi, 
where conditions were most favourable for such activities.
112
  For Rukeba, it was time to 
adopt a different approach.   
On the night of 20 December, the Bugesera invasion was launched.  Of course, had the 
Rwandan National Guard been a more formidable force, the invasion of a few hundred Tutsi 
refugees with largely homemade weapons might barely have been considered a threat.  As it 
happened, however, the invaders were able to attack and overrun a small Rwandan military 
camp, obtaining two vehicles and some light arms.
113
  They also increased their number by 
several hundred through rallying local Tutsi – an action that provoked great fear amongst the 
Hutu population.
114
  The invaders came within 20 kilometres of the capital city of Kigali 
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before meeting any resistance.  There, at the Kanzenze bridge on the Nyabarongo River, a 
battle ensued with a company of the Rwandan national guard, and the invading force was 
quickly overrun.
115
  A combination of factors led the Rwandan government to a panic-
stricken response, however.  The Rwandan National Guard consisted of only 1000 men who 
were poorly armed and poorly equipped, and spread thinly around the country.
116
  Its 
commander was a lieutenant barely two years out of Officers‟ school.117  The mountainous 
nature of the country and its largely open borders made defence particularly difficult.  
Furthermore, there were deep fears that the Tutsi population in Rwanda would join the 
invaders in a grab for power.    
Perhaps the greatest fear, though, was that “the attack was part of a concerted plot from 
several directions to overthrow the regime and restore the monarchy,” possibly with the 
collusion of the government of Burundi.
118
  At first, this terrible scenario appeared to be 
materialising.  On 21 and 22 December there were a number of cross-border raids from the 
Congo.  On 25 December the Ugandan authorities intercepted a further group before they 
could cross the border from Uganda; a second group of about 600 men managed to cross the 
border, but were repelled by a National Guard that had been forewarned of their arrival 
several days in advance.
119
  As the Rwandan government scrambled to respond to these 
threats, it dispatched government officials to each region to organise „civilian defence forces‟ 
to aid the army.
120
  As Lemarchand has noted: 
These arrangements were made within a few hours, in an atmosphere of panic, and 
therefore with little attention to procedural details or co-ordination.  Meanwhile, Kigali 
Radio repeatedly beamed emergency warnings, asking the population to be „constantly on 
the alert‟ for Tutsi terrorists.  In this atmosphere of intense fear, saturated with rumour 
and suspicion, the worst was bound to happen.
121
  
 
What was intended for self-defence turned into a serious of vicious reprisals and massacres of 
Rwandan Tutsi.  The worst were undoubtedly in the region of Gikongoro.  In this former seat 
of Tutsi power, rumours flew that the government in Kigali had fallen, and the Mwami had 
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been restored to power.
122
  The local prefect is reported to have the sparked the massacres by 
asserting at a hastily arranged meeting of local leaders: “We are expected to defend 
ourselves.  The only way to go about it is to paralyse the Tutsi.  How?  They must be 
killed.”123  By all accounts, the violence was brutal.  The use of traditional arms was 
widespread, and there are many accounts of great cruelty.  Without central organisation, local 
influences determined the severity of the massacres in each area.  Only in Kibungo prefecture 
were local leaders and priests able to work together to prevent the outbreak of violence.
124
  
Elsewhere, some 10,000 – 14,000 were killed in late December and early January.125  Only as 
it became clear that the Kayibanda government retained control and that there was no major 
threat did the massacres abate.  By mid-January the mass killing had ceased, and despite 
further inyenzi raids in late January and early February, it did not recommence.
126
 In many 
respects though, it was too late.  The tiny newborn nation of Rwanda had been changed 
forever.   
Contrary to the sensationalist headlines in The Times, the massacres in Rwanda in 1964 were 
not regarded as genocide at the time.  UN Commissioner Max Dorsinville, in Rwanda both as 
the massacres unfolded in late December to early January, and again in February after their 
cessation, reported “There is no question of a systematic elimination or extermination of the 
Batutsi, or of what some sources have hastened to call genocide.”127  Nor was there sustained 
persecution of the Tutsi in their wake.  While a number of Tutsi leaders had been killed 
during the massacres, nearly half of Rwanda‟s administration continued to be staffed by 
Tutsi, and they continued to form the majority of teachers at secondary schools.
128
  
Kayibanda promised “those responsible for these excesses will be ruthlessly punished,” 
although the subsequent investigations were flawed.
129
  By mid-1964 the Kayibanda 
government was expressing its desires for peace and tolerance: “Today more than ever, after 
the hard lesson inflicted on the terrorists, Rwanda wants to be a tolerant and peaceful nation.  
This is the will of all the people, and this is the will of all its leaders.”130  And indeed, the 
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Hutu and Tutsi populations in Rwanda returned to a largely peaceful, if sometimes uneasy, 
co-existence.   
Yet the legacy of the massacres was profound.  The massacres left the UNAR leadership 
decimated, and the UNAR newspaper Unité was no longer published.  They effectively 
resulted “in the silencing of the opposition.”131  Rwanda became, and largely remained, a 
Hutu nation.
132
  In the wake of the violence a further wave of Tutsi fled Rwanda as refugees.  
Estimates of Rwandan refugees in 1964 were that over 336,000 were scattered in bordering 
nations.
133
  Decades later, the children of some of these refugees would form the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front and invade Rwanda in 1990.  As in 1964, they would be viewed as deeply 
threatening to the very being of the nation.  The polarisation that had occurred over the 
decade between 1954 and 1964 led to a society in which Hutu-Tutsi divisions remained 
prominent, and politicised.  Obstructions to the achievement of political goals were at times 
blamed on „cockroachism‟.134  The view of the Hutu-Tutsi divide remained a racial one, with 
the colonial ancillary to the Hamitic hypothesis – that the Tutsi were therefore foreigners – 
remaining salient within the society.
135
  In this context, little was done to address the refugee 
problem.  Furthermore, the manner in which intergroup divisions had been politicised 
between 1954 and 1964 led to perceptions of political power in the nation as a „zero-sum‟ 
game.  Rather than approaches that sought to accommodate the needs and desires of both 
Hutu and Tutsi, it seemed that the gains of one group could only come at the expense of the 
other.   
The decade between 1954 and 1964 was a momentous one in Rwanda‟s history.  At its 
opening, Tutsi privilege and power were deeply entrenched within Rwandan society; by its 
end, the reversal of authority was all but absolute.  For the Hutu majority, this was a profound 
liberation to be celebrated.  Yet the legacy of their historical disadvantage continued to 
impact the new nation.  The massive challenges ahead of the new Hutu government were 
compounded by a lack of appropriate education and experience amongst its members.  A 
deep insecurity and fear of a return to Tutsi hegemony lurked in the shadows of Rwandan 
politics.  And key opportunities to promote unity and moderation in the decolonisation 
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process had been lost in a spiral of ethnic polarisation.  The Rwanda of 1964 was a fractured 
nation.  
 
